#1013 What Does It Mean to Say that Some Worlds Are Infeasible for God?

Dr. craig’s response

Sometimes I do squirm uncomfortably, Howard, in saying that certain possible worlds are infeasible for God because I’m sure that many lay people do not understand that this is a term of art that presupposes a background of Molinism’s theory of middle knowledge. The problem is that one cannot explain the theory of middle knowledge every time one is called upon to address a question like “Why didn’t God create a world in which everyone freely always does the right thing?” One has to assume the familiarity of one’s audience with the debate and let the chips fall where they may.

The idea here is that in deciding to actualize a world, God is confronted with an infinite range of logically possible worlds to choose from. Since He exists in every possible world, it is obvious logically possible that that world be actualized. The problem is that from the perspective of the actual world, certain subjunctive conditionals concerning how persons would freely choose in various circumstances are true independently of God’s will. So the set of these so-called counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, like “If Peter were in circumstances C, he would deny Christ three times,” serve to winnow down the range of possible worlds which God can actualize. If it is true that Peter would deny Christ three times under circumstances C, then God cannot actualize a possible world in which Peter is in precisely those circumstances and does not deny Christ three times.

So how do we express this limitation on God’s choices? Contemporary defenders of middle knowledge say that these counterfactuals of creaturely freedom narrow down the range of possible worlds to the range of worlds that are feasible for God to actualize. Worlds that are logically possible but are precluded by the true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom are said to be infeasible for God.

This is not a limitation on God’s power, because there is no state of affairs that God is unable to actualize due to a lack of power on his part. Rather, as you say, any such state of affairs is in some way defective and so unactualizable. Now it is logically impossible for God to make someone freely do something. Yet in order to actualize a world precluded by the true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, that is exactly what He would have to do. Therefore, the fact that God cannot actualize these worlds is not a limitation on His omnipotence.