#938 Does Everything Happen Necessarily?

Dr. craig’s response

My fear, Peter, is that this pastor is actually in a very precarious situation, in which he could lose his faith if he begins to reflect seriously on the ramifications of his position. Therefore, I am not sure that it would be a good idea to try to refute his views, lest you drive him to apostasy. Benign neglect might be the more charitable approach.

What’s wrong with his position? In the first place, there is no good reason to adopt his view that everything happens necessarily. Why should we think, contrary to our modal intuitions, that there are no contingent truths? His argument from God’s necessary goodness is unconvincing. Classical theologians have always believed that God is necessarily good, but that does not preclude his ability to choose between options. Even if God must always choose the best, it does not follow that all his choices are necessary. Your pastor’s argument assumes that there are no morally neutral choices. But if the alternatives are equally good, then a morally perfect being can freely choose either one of them. A classic example of such a choice is whether the cosmic spheres should rotate clockwise or counter-clockwise. There is no reason to think that one choice is morally better than the other. Even if there is a best possible world, why think that it is unique rather than one of a range of equally good worlds in the top tier?

Moreover, why should we think that a morally perfect being must always choose the best? The pastor just assumes that there is a best possible world. But what if there is no best possible world? Suppose that worlds can be ranked better and better without a best world. In that case, it is impossible for God to choose the best world. Whatever world he chooses, he will do so knowing that he could have chosen a better world. In such a case God must do what decision theorists call “satisficing,” that is to say, he must choose a good world that is consistent with his nature, even though he could have chosen a better one. Your pastor friend is committed to the position, not only that there is a best possible world (itself a radical position), but, even more radically, that our world is the best possible world! This is as good as it can possibly get, and nothing could be better than it is. That is highly implausible, if not patently absurd. Moreover, he is committed to the assumptions that if the outcome of one’s choice could be better, then one’s choice could be better, and that if an agent’s choice could be better, then that agent could be better, assumptions which are far from obvious. You’ll find a lengthy discussion of these issues in volume IIa of my Systematic Philosophical Theology under the topic of God’s goodness.

Not only is there no good reason to adopt the pastor’s radical position, but there are good reasons to reject it. For example, what does his view imply for moral responsibility? If all of our moral choices are logically necessary, as he believes, then how can we be held morally responsible for sinful acts? If it is logically impossible for you to do otherwise, then you cannot be held morally responsible for what you do. But if we are not responsible moral agents, that completely subverts the Christian doctrines of sin and of salvation. There really is no sin and, hence, no salvation from sin. The whole Christian religion is undermined. You see why I fear for this man’s faith.